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2Institutional Change and Firm Adaptation:
Toward a Typology of Southeast Asian Corporate Forms
Abstract
We develop a typology of organizational forms found in Southeast Asia that contains four major
archetypes, Colonial Business Groups, Family Business Groups, Government Linked Enterprises, and
New Managers. We explain how the institutional environment prevailing at their founding profoundly
influence the strategies and capabilities of each form. Consequently, strategic repertoires and
competencies that are imperfectly aligned with environmental conditions largely delimit the capacity for
organizational adaptation in the face of environmental change. We discuss the consequences of such a
pattern of path dependence for each organizational form as well as the social and economic systems in
which they are embedded.
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3Institutional Change and Firm Adaptation in Southeast Asia: Toward a Typology
Corporate Forms
The comparative study of management demands some method for classifying organisations if we
are to make valid generalisations about their behaviour (Perrow, 1977). Typologies are intended to
indicate meaningful differences between the types of organisation classified and are a necessary device
for understanding, generalising and delimiting organisational theories. In this paper, we employ
institutional theories of organisational adaptation to develop a typology of large-scale domestic
enterprises from Southeast Asia 1. A robust typology of Southeast Asian corporate forms is needed to
further the discourse on a range of economic and managerial issues pertaining to the region’s firms. Such
typologies may also be useful to practitioners who need to understand the type of organisation they are
dealing with so that they can be effective in dealing with that organisation and its members.
While some research has examined major forms of business enterprise in East and Southeast
Asia, most of these studies have utilised a prima facia  criteria, country of origin, as the basis for their
categorisations. Such an approach is ill suited for the identification of shared characteristics among
organisations from different nations because an explicit or implicit objective is to relate organizational
characteristics to particular institutional structures and/or cultural phenomena (Hamilton and Biggart,
1988; Hall and Xu, 1990; Whitely, 1992). Such research has made many important contributions to our
understanding of East Asian business forms (Lowe, 1998). However, in emphasising the salience of social
and cultural determinants of corporate organisation, these perspectives may overstate differences between
organisations within the larger regional context. Moreover, such approaches may also understate the
influence of economic incentives and market forces (Wilkinson, 1996).
In this paper we demonstrate that corporate forms of organization are neither unique to societies,
nor are societies uniquely defined by a single organisational form. In particular, we show that in Southeast
Asia, categories of indigenous organisation are apparent that share close similarities with those found in
adjacent, but dissimilar social and cultural contexts. For instance, we explain that the organisational logic
4and business behaviour that characterise Family Business Groups or Government Linked Enterprises can
be observed in countries as culturally and socially diverse as Islamic Indonesia, Buddhist Thailand and
Christian Philippines.
The paper is organized in the following manner. We begin by developing a typology of
indigenous corporate forms found in capitalist Southeast Asia. In doing so, we describe regional and
global institutional forces which provided the seedbeds for their emergence and growth. Subsequently, we
describe the capabilities and key aspects of strategic behaviour for each form. In concluding the paper, we
examine patterns and consequences of inter-species rivalry among these organisational forms and discuss
some implications of our analysis for economic development in Southeast Asia.
Institutional Processes and Organizational Forms
Phenomena such as the decline of colonialism, the growth of industrialisation, the cold war,
privatisation, and the emergence of free-trade blocks are not self-contained within a specific national
context. Rather such phenomena are global in their scope.  Their effect is to stimulate national responses
that, among other things, produce changes in the prevalence and incidence of corporate forms within
nations. While there are differences in the way nations respond to global forces and these differences
produce contrasting patterns of national organising (Fligstein and Freeland, 1995) important similarities
also exist (Meyer, 1994; Murphy, 1994). Our typology of four Southeast Asian organizational archetypes
is based upon the notion that global forces and organisational level processes interact together to engender
similar organizations across different societies.
This typology is constructed along two dimensions: nascent conditions and organisational logic
represented in Figure 1. Nascent conditions refer to the institutional environment that marked the birth
and emergence of a corporate form, organisational logic incorporates elements of constrained strategic
choice carried out by human agents. In contrast to a symmetrical two by two matrix, the corners of Figure
1 are a trapezium. This presentation permits the spatial depiction of the nascent conditions across the
three historical periods during which organisational forms currently active in the Southeast Asian region
emerged.
5-----------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 About Here
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Nascent Institutional Conditions
Over the last 100 years, the Southeast Asian region can be distinguished by three historical eras.
Each era engendered distinct organization forms. The first, the Colonial Era, reached its full extent in the
mid-19th century and went into decline after 1941. This era produced an indigenous class of expatriate
merchant trading organizations, which can be termed Colonial Business Groups (CBGs). The Nationalist
Era followed the watershed of World War II, and is marked by the introduction of more assertive self-
government in the region2. The Nationalist Era saw the emergence of both the Family Business Groups
(FBGs) and Government Linked Enterprises (GLE) as major forms of business enterprise. In terms of the
typology presented here, FBGs are the second type of merchant organization. In Southeast Asia, they are
mostly, but not exclusively, owned and controlled by overseas ethnic Chinese families. As their name
suggests, GLEs are either state-owned or state sponsored firms that, along with commercial goals, pursue
state-sanctioned strategies and missions and they display a predominantly managerial organizational
logic.
The third historical era is the Modern Era and is marked by two epochal events. First, the
adoption by China in 1978 of Deng Xiao Ping's four modernizations’s which resulted in the gradual
opening of China to foreign investment. China later became a major rival to Southeast Asia for FDI.
More importantly China’s open door signaled a reduction in Cold War tensions and allowed states to
focus upon their economic agendas. The second major event was the Plaza Accord of 1985, which led to
the Japanese Yen's appreciation against the U.S. Dollar and stimulated a sudden increase in Japanese, and
later Western, investment into the region (Stubbs, 1994). Together these events accelerated the movement
of capital into and within the region and further increased the already rapid pace of industrialization
(Krugman, 1994).
6The Modern Era is marked by an easing of Cold War tensions and permitted governments to
focus their attention on trade and the sources of national economic competitiveness (McVey, 1992). In
this environment, we see the birth of a new high technology firms (Vogel, 1991), which can be termed the
New Managers. Recently established, New Managers either possess, or are developing, professional
management, formal organizational structures, managerial appraisal systems and relatively focused
business strategies. New Managers are often still dominated by founding entrepreneurs, but appear to
organize around logic that is a hybrid of Asian and Western organizational characteristics (Mathews and
Snow, 1997).
Organisational logic
We use the term organisational logic to describe ‘world views’ (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) or
‘interpretative schemes’ (Ranson, Hinings, and Greenwood, 1980) found among categories of
organisations across Southeast Asian societies. In particular, we distinguish between merchant and
managerial logics. The merchant logic is predicated upon personalised relations and market or contractual
based transactions (Porter and Livesay, 1971; Chan, 1982). On the other hand, firms organised around a
managerial ethos are characterised by a bureaucratic rationality and a preference for hierarchical control
(Chandler, 1990).
Organisational logics are long lasting and profoundly influenced by circumstances prevailing at
the time of founding and during early growth (Starbuck, 1965). In this early period, the strategies of
successful and surviving organisations are reinforced by cycles of market feedback (Prahalad and Bettis,
1986) and organizational logic is also strongly influenced by prevailing cultural values (Redding, 1990)
and institutionalised behaviour (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988). Strategic practices that are developed in the
first few years of a firm’s operations become deeply rooted or imprinted in organisational memory and
repertoires (Nelson & Winter, 1989). Importantly, organizational logic drives attempts at subsequent
environmental adaptations (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). The longer a particular set of strategies is in
place, the more difficult it is for an organisation to unlearn them (Prahalad and Bettis 1986). Therefore,
logic also acts as an inertial force upon change, delimiting the range of options an organisation may
7evoke. In evolutionary terms, some strategic responses become ‘locked in’ while others are
simultaneously ‘locked-out.
Dimensions of Strategic Choice
Each of the 4 corporate forms depicted in Figure 1 reflect both a set of strategic choices made at
the firm level and the institutional context which marked their emergence and development. In the
typology developed here, four dimensions are used to capture the range of strategic initiatives
organisations in Southeast Asia have used in response to the conditions they faced. We consider Strategy
Formation, product market scope, asset composition and geographic scope.
Strategy Formation: In the following analysis, the corporate forms evaluated here are distinguished from
each other in terms of their primary strategic goals. Strategic goals refers to a firm’s basic mission and
stance relating to financial performance such as market value, accounting profits, and revenue growth.
Product-market scope: The prevailing view of Southeast Asian enterprise is that they are characterised
by broad product market scope and conglomerate organisation driven by opportunistic and unrelated
diversification (Whitley, 1992). Our analysis indicates that this portrayal is an over-generalisation and
that a much wider range product-market choices have been made by Southeast Asian enterprises.
Asset Regime: By definition, industrialisation produces asset accumulation. The four corporate forms
described here are distinguished in terms of their distinct patterns of accumulating and investing in
specialised tangible and intangible (Williamson, 1991).
Internationalisation: In considering the international activities of Southeast Asian firms, our analysis
examines the extent to which different forms of organisation are moving beyond strategies based upon
trade and export and are engaging in international alliances and foreign direct investment (FDI). Our
analysis highlights the distinguishing features of each organisational form described here in terms of the
eclectic model, which posits diverse motives for FDI and strategic alliances (1995).
Forms of Southeast Asian Enterprise
In this section, we describe and elaborate upon the analytical and theoretical basis for the
typology of corporate forms represented in Figure 1. Each of the corporate forms identified here
8represents a distinct ‘gestalt’ (Hambrick, 1983), or ‘configuration’ (Mintzberg, 1979) of strategic
responses which are ‘tightly integrated’ and consist of ‘mutually supportive parts’ (Miller, 1981:3).
Many possible responses to the environmental forces faced by firms in Southeast Asia existed, but the
forms described below represent the most salient and enduring organisational responses.
Below we offer a description and analysis of each of the four corporate forms in the typology.
The presentation of this discussion and analysis proceeds as follows. First, in order to situate the
organisational form in the context of the paper, a brief overview of the organisational form is presented.
Second, the institutional context that marked the emergence and development of each organisational form
is described. Third, the modern day significance of each organisational form is evaluated with reference
to their strategic behaviour and orientation.
-------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 About Here
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Colonial Business Groups
CBGs represent the most enduring of the corporate forms currently present in Southeast Asia. As
their name suggests, these firms emerged during the region’s Colonial Era and are the outgrowth of three
sets of institutional forces present during that era. CBGs emerged as entrepreneurs that followed the flag
of their native country and their subsequent growth patterns mirrored the colonial activities of their home
country. The operational practices of CBGs were also profoundly shaped by home country demand.
Finally, the CBGs have a distinctive merchant ethos reflected in the pioneering spirit of their founders-
Colonial Era entrepreneurs.
Origins of Colonial Business Groups
Prior to the development of the multinational enterprise, the prevailing instrument of trade was
the expatriate investment and trading house (Chapman, 1985). As an investment house CBGs performed
the task of local managerial agency over a range of mercantile activities to represent the growing
industrial domestic business interests in foreign markets. During the period of rapid colonial territorial
9expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries, trading and commercial interests followed their national flag. The
trading houses of major colonial powers developed a distinctive sphere of influence where they were pre-
eminent. For example, Japanese trading houses Matsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo were active in Korea,
Taiwan, and Manchuria. Dutch traders and Dutch crown agents dominated the Dutch East Indies
(Indonesia) oil, coffee, tobacco, and sugar trades (Allen and Donnithorne, 1957). With origins in 18th
century India, British traders such as Guthrie, the Borneo Company (now Inchcape) and Sime-Darby were
active in Malaya (Malaysia and Singapore) and Thailand (Falkus, 1989).
Despite the creation of territorial strongholds, the effect of pre-eminence in a colonial domain
was to make the colonial traders relatively uncosmopolitan. In particular, the British perfected a
comprador form of capitalism that utilised overseas Chinese immigrants as go-betweens with indigenous
communities. Internationally, the CBGs traded mainly with businesses from their home country (Drabble
and Drake, 1981). CBGs appear superficially international because of their wide-ranging trading activities
(Lasserre and Schutte, 1999). On closer inspection they can be seen as parochial organisations because for
the most part they acted as agents in a two-way trade between their home country and a specific colony in
its colonial empire (Jones, 2000).
Industrialisation in Europe and Japan created a demand for oil, minerals, and agricultural raw
materials from Southeast Asia as well as the reciprocal need to create and develop markets for
manufactured goods (Davenport Hines and Jones, 1989). For example, the creation and rapid expansion
of the Malayan rubber plantation was a response to the growth of the motor car and pneumatic tire (Allen
and Donnithorne, 1957), and the Thai teak logging industry was intimately tied to the growth of railways
(Falkus, 1989). The rapid growth and subsequent decline of the Philippine abaca (hemp) industry was
exclusively tied to the demand for ship’s rope (Brown, 1997).
 However, prices and domestic demand for categories of raw materials was highly variable
(Brown, 1997) subject to both variation in the normal business trade cycle and from competition from
substitute materials (Allen and Donnithorne, 1957). Where demand was especially strong and enduring,
as in the case of oil, CBGs surrendered to the arrival of emerging multinationals that began to re-
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internalise activities handled by agents. CBGs reflected the pioneering spirit of the Colonial Era. As such,
the CBGs operated under a liberal pro-trade ethos (Murphy, 1994) and their trading activities benefited
from several technological innovations such as the introduction of the telegraph and improvements in ship
design and speed. However, CBGs embodied the pioneering spirit of the expansionist colonial era, which
triggered agricultural and organisational innovations in new and uncertain environments. Allen and
Donnithorne (1957) credit European traders with the development and local cultivation of several non-
indigenous commodities such as coffee, tobacco and rubber and with the introduction of capital intensive
extraction of oil and tin. In early 20th century, CBGs applied the management agency function first to
insurance and financial services and later to a wide range of infrastructure franchises such as electricity
and telecommunications and exclusive distributorships.
CBGS IN THE MODERN ERA
Colonial era relations were abruptly and permanently disrupted following 1941 with the
establishment of Japanese military administration (Gunseikanbu) over Southeast Asia’s economy (Twang,
1998). After 1945 the assets of pre-war Japanese CBGs were seized and redistributed to newly
independent governments or to re-instated colonial administrations. Where feasible the remaining assets
of Western colonial firms were restored to their owners. However, CBGs are of decreasing importance in
the Modern Era, in part due to the emergence and growth of other corporate forms. Yet they remain an
important analytical category because they provided the corporate model for many indigenous and
immigrant entrepreneurs. Moreover, while often under new local ownership (McVey, 1992; Mackie,
1992), CBGs are characterised by strategic continuity and they remain significant players in several
commercial and financial sectors (Lasserre and Schutte, 1999).
Strategy Formation. The transition from colonial to nationalist rule was rarely smooth and CBGs in the
modern era found themselves in hostile environments. Where there was no civil war there was political
and military competition for power from both capitalist and communist oriented political parties. Colonial
prestige never fully recovered from Japanese occupation (Twang, 1998). As a consequence of the
changing institutional environment, the ownership structures of CBGs in the Modern Era became quite
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diverse. For example, following the adoption of a New Economic Policy by the Malaysian Government,
the ownership of many Malaysian based CBGs passed into the hands of local entrepreneurs in a sequence
of often-hostile take-overs (van Helten and Jones, 1989). In other parts of the region, an emergent class of
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs purchased the assets of retreating CBGs (Mackie, 1992). Elsewhere CBG
assets were taken into state ownership or, especially in Singapore, remained in the hands of colonial era
owners
Despite the heterogeneity in their ownership structures, CBGs have in common the adoption of
short-term profitability as their pre-eminent strategic goal-often at the expense of growth. CBGs whether
under local or original ownership control have not grown to become truly global enterprises (Jones,
2000). Indeed, the post-war growth rates of CBGs have been modest relative to the later starting Chinese
FBGs (Carney, 1998).
Wherever Colonial Era ownership and control persisted, real and perceived conflicts of interests
between their country of origin and newly independent national governments resulted in a relatively
defensive and conservative business posture. As such, CBGs have emphasised short-term profitability
limited only by the need to maintain a high stock price in the expectation of liquidation. In short, subject
to a stock price constraint, and due to their precarious political position, CBGs pursue financial goals
related to short-term profitability and emphasise short-term cash flow, rather than growth opportunities.
Product Market Scope: Due in part to variable home country demand, CBGs are not strongly attached to
any particular line of business and many have made remarkable product-market transformations 3. Key
CBG advantages are reputation, knowledge of supply and demand conditions in their home and colonial
territory and the skills associated with trade and management agency. This form of organisation has
proven highly adaptive, as its basic competency, managerial agency, is applicable across a wide range of
commercial settings, such as franchise holding. CBG capacity to exploit local market opportunities is a
function of both local and distant reputation. Recent analysis has applied the logic of reputation as a core
competence to the conglomerate organisation (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998). Khanna and Palepu suggest
that in underdeveloped institutional environments, diversified business groups perform an extra-judicial
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arbitration service and are described ‘a haven where property rights are respected’ (1997:47).
CBGs did not vertically integrate into upstream production related activities due in part to the
risks associated with variable demand for agricultural and industrial commodities. Rather CBGs continue
to rely on their management agency competencies to diversify across a broad range of downstream
retailing, service and commercial activities.
Asset Regime. As a consequence of their established relations with domestic manufacturers and the
fluctuating nature of home demand, CBGs developed two deeply rooted characteristics: a preference for
liquidity (or the avoidance of investment in capital intensive activities) and an aversion to manufacturing
(Drabble and Drake, 1981). The political and economic uncertainties of trading, the risks of an agency
business being re-internalised by a proprietary owner and the need to re-deploy assets to new economic
activities created in CBGs a preference for liquidity. As CBGs are predominantly commercial, or business
services organisations, their financial and trade activity is reflected in an asset base weighted heavily
toward financial and short-term assets. Capital investment is directed toward assets that can be easily
marketed such as properties and securities, or to assets which can be quickly depreciated. The franchises
of CBGs and their contractual distribution arrangements carry a finite time-horizon and their implicit
value can be capitalised as goodwill, an intangible asset. Indeed, the core value of these firms' assets is in
their local knowledge and reputation and to a large extent, these values will be related to the perceived
security of tenure within an eminent domain. The transfer of ownership in recent years to politically
acceptable local interests maintains the underlying value of these assets. These considerations suggest that
CBGs are characterised by low levels of capital expenditures in property plant and equipment. Rather,
high levels of intangible assets (such as goodwill) and financial assets (such as property investments)
relative to fixed and tangible assets will characterise their asset regimes.
Internationalisation.  The growth and international expansion of CBGs was truncated at the beginning of
the 20th Century by the arrival in the region of the re-internalising MNE (Davenport-Hines and Jones,
1989). Internalisation by MNE’s is an endemic problem among of CBGs except in industries that use
franchises and agencies as the main distribution and marketing method. As such, vehicle distribution,
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hotels, and food service have remained product-market staples for CBGs. Additionally; post WWII
nationalist economic policies of governments in Southeast Asia have further constrained the business
scope of CBGs. To escape the pincer movement of expanding MNEs on the one hand and nationalist
economic policy on the other, many CBGs have attempted to expand internationally.
Despite intentions to the contrary, CBGs find international expansions very difficult4. Part of the
difficulty faced by CBGs is that the core competence of local knowledge and reputation are location
specific assets and are not easily transferable to new regions. Nor does the holding company corporate
structure characteristic of CBGs promote intra-firm co-ordination, or the acquisition of new
competencies. Attempts to internationalise are generally carried out through the acquisition of existing
firms because the competence base of CBGs cannot support market seeking foreign investments.
Moreover, the activities of CBGs are concentrated in service sectors requiring in-situ production and that
do not permit efficiency seeking relocation (Reich, 1991). As a consequence, the overseas investments of
CBGs consist mainly of passive asset holdings. In these circumstances, CBGs may exercise de jure
control over acquired assets, but can do little to add value in contexts where they possess little local
knowledge and where they have little reputation. In sum, outside of their core activities in trading and
franchise holding, the international activities of CBGs consist mainly of passive investments in foreign
assets.
Family Business Groups (FBGs)
Overseas Chinese entrepreneurial success is frequently attributed to Confucian cultural values of
diligence, order, filial piety and familial responsibility, which promotes prudent use of resources and
capital accumulation (Redding, 1990; Hodder, 1996). Indeed, these Confucian values have endured over
many centuries. However, it took developments in the post WWII Nationalist Era to bring the
entrepreneurs who espoused Confucian values to prominence in the Southeast Asian region. Since their
emergence in the Nationalist Era, these entrepreneurs have typically used the Business Group form
(Granovetter, 1994).
On the one hand, the FBG can be seen as a post-colonial version of the CBG in that FBGs and
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CBGs both possess a similar merchant orientation. On the other hand, the mercantile propensity of the
FBG is the product of institutional forces very different from those that marked the development of CBGs
in the Colonial Era. Specifically, FBGs emerged and developed during the post WWII Nationalist Era in
response to three sets of institutional forces; Diaspora, Discrimination and Nationalistic Economic
Policy.
Origins of the Family Business Group
The overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are in many ways a product of turmoil in their home country.
Successive rebellions, civil war, poverty, recurrent famine and impermeable social barriers to
advancement in China produced a steady flow of migration from China to countries in Southeast Asia
(Fairbank, 1994). Interestingly, many of the overseas Chinese who have enjoyed considerable
entrepreneurial success outside China emanated from an unstable, warring society that placed little value
on commercial activity and had no entrepreneurial tradition5. During the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries,
migrant Chinese workers migrated to predominantly agricultural societies where colonial expatriates
occupied the highest social and economic status. Nevertheless, the plantation system required the
occupation of a variety of new and diverse economic roles (Brown, 1997). Immigrant Chinese workers
were encouraged to gravitate towards jobs in tax collecting, retailing, money lending and intermediary
roles and the lower levels of trade (Wu and Wu, 1980). This ascribed position of middlemen within the
colonial order produced an enduring cosmopolitanism among overseas entrepreneurs (Mcvey, 1992).
In their capacity as intermediaries, migrant Chinese entrepreneurs were exposed to a wide range
of indigenous commercial activities in their adopted societies. As intermediaries, the Chinese immigrants
learned techniques of both trade and basic manufacturing (McVey, 1992). The value of skills and contacts
developed by the immigrant Chinese in the Colonial Era made them vitally important during the
subsequent Nationalist Era when indigenous entrepreneurial skills and capital were both in short supply
(Twang, 1998). Indeed, migrant Chinese entrepreneurs were well positioned for the changes in political
power that occurred in Southeast Asia after WWII. The Chinese Diaspora was widespread in the region
and entrepreneurs maintained personal contacts among Chinese entrepreneurs from the same family or
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language group in many countries in the region. Geographically dispersed kin-networks provided secure
channels for asset movements, capital mobilisation and for learning about profitable opportunities
(Hodder, 1996). In sum, the Diaspora produced an entrepreneurial class that was well placed to operate
international networks and which was attuned to the behaviour of a diverse group of key actors in
Southeast Asia.
Despite their economic success, and indeed possibly because of it, Chinese entrepreneurs
encountered discrimination and risked asset expropriation in their adopted societies (Hodder, 1996).
Recent violence against Chinese property in Indonesia indicates that this hostility is both grave and
enduring. Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs suffered official discrimination in Malaysia and Indonesia from
nationalist policies intended to secure greater participation in the economy for ethnic nationals (Lim,
1996). In Thailand, Indonesia and The Philippines, political corruption and bureaucratic ‘rent-seeking’
(McVey, 1992) produced wariness of the state.
A main concern for post WWII national governments’ was national security. There was a need to
restore internal order and to fend off external threats. As such, government officials were predominantly
from a military background. The economic agenda was limited to managing strategic industries and
rebuilding basic infrastructure. After the expropriation of Japanese capital after WWII and prior to the
Plaza Accord of 1985, there was little Japanese investment in the region. Most capital for investment
came from local savings. Almost without exception, states in the region adopted export oriented
development (EOD) models. These policies focused upon the provision of tax incentives and low interests
loans to spur production and the utilisation of low cost labour (or other factor advantages) to compete in
labour-intensive industries. Importantly, EOD provided many market opportunities, which were
capitalised upon by overseas Chinese entrepreneurs (Mackie, 1992.)
Family Business Groups in the Modern Era
Strategy Formation. Chandler (1990) contends that compared with managerial enterprise, kin-based
organisation is neither enduring, nor conducive to capital accumulation (Chandler, 1990). Scholars of
Chinese capitalism suggest that family businesses are unable to span more than two, or three generations
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of senior management before weakening and disintegrating (Tam, 1990; Fukuyama, 1995). FBG
ownership is ordinarily concentrated in the hands of a founding entrepreneur, the immediate family or
ancestral trust depending upon the age of the firm (Wong, 1985). The family firm's assets account for a
significant proportion of that family's wealth. This concentration of assets creates a significant risk that
can be reduced by extracting capital from the business and allocating it to alternative, safer, sources6.
Moreover, the risk of expropriation has made it prudent to avoid capital concentration.
Tam (1990) and (Wong, 1985) describe centripetal tensions that promote a near term focus on
immediate earnings in FBGs. To provide income for an extended family and inheritances for male
offspring who may wish to establish their own patrilineal businesses; there is a leaching of capital out of
the core business. Redding (1990:109) suggests the spirit of Chinese entrepreneurship is infused with
values which 'facilitate the initiating phase of entrepreneurship, but which place barriers to the higher
levels of co-ordination necessary for growth.’ Under these conditions, goals related to patient capital and
large scale or enterprise growth often give way to a concern for near-term profitability and family wealth
preservation. Likewise, Fukuyama (1995) and Kao (1993) describe the lack of capacity of FBGs for
large-scale enterprise. In summary, goals promoting large scale or enterprise growth give way to a
concern for near-term profitability and family wealth preservation.
Product Market Scope. The manufacturing opportunities offered by export oriented development (EOD)
policies provided the initial impetus for FBG growth (Yoshihara, 1988). However, FBG’s do not possess
a particular affinity for manufacturing activities. Indeed, their propensity for capital dispersion weighs
against success in capital intensive manufacturing activity. Many analysts have noted the Chinese FBG
propensity for trading (Hodder, 1996), speculating (Yoshihara, 1988), and in ventures aimed at rapid cash
generation and the maintenance of corporate liquidity (Limligan, 1986). FBG entrepreneurs favour, and
excel with opaque transactions based upon personalised relations or guanxi-a Chinese term which refers
to the practice of drawing on personal networks to secure favours in personal or business relations (Luo
and Chen, 1997). Lasserre and Schutte (1999) see FBG success as stemming from guanxi and the related
ability to exploit market imperfections arising from access to privileged contacts and non-publicly
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available information. Many of these opportunities are self-limiting, or temporary and do not require
major capital commitments.
Williamson (1997) says FBGs have a locational advantage. Situated in a fast growth region, they
benefit from local knowledge and they have the capacity to move quickly. While possibly inefficient, and
lacking specific product-market skills, they operate on the principle that 'it is better to be always first than
always right' (Williamson, 1997:55). Similarly, Whitley (1992) notes the FBG pattern of investing profits
from manufacturing into real estate and property development rather than reinvesting their profits in the
manufacturing business. Whitley refers to this pattern as ‘opportunistic diversification.’ Kao (1993:25)
suggests the preference for liquid and tangible assets results from deeply held ‘life-raft values’ stemming
from generations of economic and political uncertainty. Redding (1990) traces FBG defensiveness and
insecurity to the legacy of state disdain for mercantile activity and its thwarting of modern capitalism.
Collectively, the factors described above suggest that at the level of the family group, FBGs are widely
diversified.
However, when inspecting particular FBG enterprises at the business level, a different picture
emerges. FBGs typically organise their assets into multiple separate public listings. Ultimate majority
ownership is typically concentrated in a private enterprise registered in an offshore country. Tam (1990)
describes a tendency toward fissioning in the Chinese FBG into separate spheres of influence, sometimes
done to accommodate family interests and offspring (Wong, 1985). However, breaking up large
businesses into smaller units also offers certain important advantages to the FBG.
First, such a fragmentation of businesses operations reduces the FBG’s visibility, which can be
seen as a basic defence mechanism for ethnic minorities operating in hostile environments (Hodder 1996).
Second, the fragmentation and the creation of multiple separately listed public units is a means of
achieving monitoring and feedback on unit performance when subsidiary managers are not trusted, or
when the organisation has inadequate capacity to perform a thorough internal auditing function (Carney,
1998). Daily market valuation of a business unit's performance is a valuable managerial decision tool,
which is an advantage denied most diversified firms. Consequently, there are sound economic reasons for
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creating relatively focused product market strategies at the level of the business unit.
Asset Regime. Discrimination and suspicion of governments have also encouraged FBGs to develop
generic asset regimes and to maintain financial liquidity. The establishment of large enterprises with high
sunk costs and the promotion of brand names require patient capital and investment in specialised assets.
Such factors increase the visibility of an enterprise and increase the risk of expropriation (Williamson,
1991).
Fukuyama (1995) notes that FBGs have performed best in light manufacturing businesses such as
apparel, toys, electronic sub-components and computer peripherals and do less well in industries that are
capital intensive. Redding (1990) agrees, indicating that FBGs have a marked strategic preference for
projects characterised by labour-intensive, rather than capital-intensive technologies. Further, it has been
argued that restricting resource commitments in dedicated assets, or lock-in investments maximises
resource flexibility and is central to FBG adaptive-entrepreneurial capabilities (Chen, 1995). Rather,
capital investment is directed towards generic assets which are readily deployed to respond to shifts in
fashion and volume (Redding, 1990). Whatever capital is employed, is worked intensively, and demand
above capacity is met by subcontracting (Whitley, 1992).
A liquidity preference among FBGs also stems from weak protection for property rights
characteristic of the Nationalist Era. Regulatory mechanisms in many Southeast Asian countries are still
developing and unenforceable property rights are a disincentive to investments in specialised assets
(Ghemawatt and Khanna, 1998). Such legal and regulatory environments generate a skew towards the
adoption of generic rather than specialised investments. In sum, the effects of hostile operating
environments, strategic advantages in labour intensive settings and the weak protection of property rights
in many host countries all suggest that the asset regimes of FBGs are characterised by the use of generic,
rather than specialised assets.
Internationalisation.  FBGs emerged as a regional force during the early 1980s. The success of their
export led development quickly eroded the factor (labour) cost advantages of domestic firms whose firm-
specific proprietary advantages lay in the management of small scale operations employing labour
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intensive production technology of sufficient flexibility to produce a wide range of outputs (Lecraw,
1993; 1992). Therefore, FBGs began to internationalise in order to seek lower labour costs than were
available within their own territories. At first, Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs made extensive small-scale
investments in China. The first wave of international investments by FBGs was labour seeking assembly
transplant activities (Yeung, 1997), which were funded through internally generated funds.
While these international manufacturing activities have attracted much attention their numbers,
size and significance are dwarfed by a second wave of investments in the service sector, infrastructure,
property development and financial services. Second wave investments were made possible by a flood of
foreign portfolio investments and commercial bank lending (Henderson, 1998) which enabled FBGs to
accelerate the pace of their offshore investments and acquisitions. However, much of these investments
were in fields where the FBGs had no technological expertise (Panamond and Zethaml, 1998).
Consequently, and in the wake of the financial crisis, recent analysis suggests that much of this
investment was misdirected (Goldstein, 1998).
There are divergent explanations of this second wave. One view is that FBG investments are
consistent with Dunning's (1995) eclectic model. For example, FBG investments in hotel management,
construction, and infrastructure, are consistent with firm-specific advantages in the management of labour
intensive processes and in trade and financing (Lecraw, 1992). Others propose a catch-up explanation
(Ernst, 1998). Less favourable is a view that suggests that FBG international investments are guanxi
driven project-specific investments aimed at generating fast returns (Lasserre and Probert, 1998).
However, guanxi is location specific since there is a limit on the number and depth of personal contacts
that can be cultivated by an entrepreneur and his family. Consequently, the advantages conferred by
guanxi might be expected to decline in more distant markets. Moreover, guanxi is an essentially market
seeking asset and does not generate productivity enhancing capabilities for the firm. Indeed, guanxi may
do the opposite. As personalised investments typically escape internal bureaucratic and market scrutiny,
many may be allocated to inefficient or low return projects.
It is the over-personalisation of capital allocation that underscores Krugman's (1994) influential
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critique of the Asian development model. Krugman proposes that many Asian economies have failed to
develop microeconomic mechanisms that create productivity improvements. While some have heralded
the emergence of FBG FDI and the development of the Asian multinational (Yeung, 1997; Lecraw,
1993), others suggest that it is a form of disguised portfolio investment and a case of capital flight
(Yoshihara, 1988). In the latter view, a significant portion of Asian FDI may be neither market, nor asset
seeking, rather it is wealth seeking reflecting attempts by entrepreneurs to internationally diversify their
personal and familial wealth. Together, these considerations suggest that relative to other firms in
Southeast Asia, a significant portion of the FDI activities of the FBG consist of investments stemming
from the firm-specific advantages of relational contracting and the management of labour intensive
production processes. Secondly, relative to other firms in Southeast Asia, a significant portion of the FDI
activities of the FBG consists of passive investments in foreign assets.
Government Linked Enterprises (GLEs)
As their name suggests, GLEs are Southeast Asian firms which are either directly controlled by a
national government, or have multiple and long lasting ties with a government7. GLEs emerged during the
post WWII Nationalist Era and continue to play an important role in the economies of many Southeast
Asian economies. The overriding contextual force that marked the emergence and development of the
GLE is Nationbuilding. The GLE came into being to meet the economic development and infrastructural
needs of Southeast Asian economies in the post WWII period.
Origins of the Government Linked Enterprise
The prevailing ideology of the Nationalist Era was a strong belief in the efficacy of state planning
(Vogel, 1991). In the aftermath of WWII, a new wave of nationalist politicians and bureaucrats, many
educated in the New-Deal U.S. and European schools embarked upon leading domestic capitalist
institutions toward national objectives and policy priorities (Wade, 1990). Public policy goals of
modernisation and a desire to advance the social position of previously excluded ethnic groups were
prominent features of the business environment which marked the emergence of the GLE in the early
Nationalist Era (Lim, 1996)
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The emphasis placed on nationbuilding in the Nationalist Era stemmed both from colonial retreat
and perceived external or internal threats to the state. Following a period of Japanese occupation during
WWII, Southeast Asian states struggled to establish themselves against communist forces. Assisted by
U.S. military and civil aid, many Southeast Asian countries attempted to develop their economic and
technological infrastructures as a means of promoting economic and social stability. During this period,
capital and technology intensive industries, such as energy, aviation, and telecommunications were
considered vital to a country's national security. However, CBGs were cautious about extending
investments under new political regimes and Chinese FBGs possessed neither the capacity, nor the
inclination to enter these industries (Vogel, 1991). As such, the preferred vehicle for building
infrastructure was the GLE (Wade, 1990).
Many former colonial era enterprises became state enterprises as a direct result of colonial retreat.
For example, in Singapore, the state inherited several naval shipyards that became the centrepiece of a
diversified oil services industry. In Singapore the state established enterprises with particular industrial
missions. While GLEs are often widely held public companies their close relationship with government
shareholders create potential agency problems because GLE managers are frequently appointed for their
commitment and allegiance to public goals (Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998).
GLEs in the Modern Era
Strategy Formation. Southeast Asian governments have often targeted for development strategic
industries and established GLEs to co-ordinate them. Strategic industries are typically related to natural
resources such as oil in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and rubber in Malaysia and in lumber
Indonesia. The core GLE mission is capacity building, the establishment of large-scale capital-intensive
industry. Such capacity is often complimentary to the small firm size-structure that characterises light
engineering and consumer manufacturing sectors. Indeed, Fukuyama (1995) suggests the need for state
involvement in heavy industry results from FBG dominated economies that are ill equipped to organise
large-scale industry. Several writers (Lim, 1996, McVey, 1992) note that Singapore's state capitalism is a
proactive response to a perceived lack of entrepreneurial acumen on the part of indigenous entrepreneurs.
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However, state owned enterprises (SOEs) also generally cluster in ‘heavy industries’ that are capital
intensive and potentially monopolistic (Caves, 1989) and SOEs also dominate Southeast Asia’s main
utilities such as telecommunications, power, transport and infrastructure.
Historically, GLEs appear to operate profitably. Whether this is due to subsidised capital and their
quasi-monopoly status or to sound administration is unclear. Typical of SOEs, GLEs possess dual
missions; to operate commercially, but also to pursue a specific mission established by government. With
regard to strategic goals GLEs have externally imposed mandates and must balance profitability with
goals aimed at contributing to the home nation’s industrial capacity.
Product Market Scope. In many cases, it is difficult to discern unequivocally the effects of political
preference and a dual mission on GLE product market strategy. GLEs have often been profitable and have
established capacity, but these accomplishments have often been achieved at the cost of being inefficient
and entrepreneurial weakness (Noble, 1998). Some analysts like Wade (1990) and Mathews (1999) credit
industrial policy with successful industrial development. Similarly, Schein (1996) partly attributes
Singapore's successful economic development to a pragmatic policy of establishing government owned
enterprises and statutory boards in selected industrial sectors. However, others suggest that state policy
has directed strategic industries into non-dynamic stages of the value chain (Hobday, 2000). In general,
the product-market scope of GLEs are typically narrowly focused on industries deemed strategic by the
state.
Asset Regime. Their close government ties profoundly influence the size and composition of the asset
bases of GLEs. Indeed, several detailed accounts of GLE micro-management and state support exist (e.g.
Vogel, 1988; Wade, 1990; Schein, 1996). From the perspective of the GLE, close ties with their host
government provides them with several advantages pertaining to revenue generation, for example,
obtaining contracts with other government enterprises. GLEs also enjoy access to cheaper capital and
secure sources of credit. These advantages support growth rates above what might be achieved unassisted.
In the absence of competition, GLEs domestic profitability must be tacitly negotiated with
governments because excessive profits are seen as illegitimate. Granovetter (1994) alludes to a moral
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restraint that constrains monopolistic behaviour. As such, a rate of return may be negotiated or decreed by
the state. However, rate of return constraints provide incentives to over-expand capital bases as a means
of promoting profit growth. Over-investment is also predicted the by public choice literature, which
suggests that government related agencies have a propensity to empire-build and accrete activities beyond
their original mission (Mitnik, 1980).
Southeast Asian developmental oriented countries have adopted an Asian industrial policy model
that directs and concentrates investments in selected sectors. For example, in the Modern Era, industrial
programs designed to establish automobile and aerospace sectors have been promoted as governments
attempt to repeat earlier successes in labour intensive sectors by emphasising more value-added activities
(World Bank, 1993). However, much of this state investment is often made without regard to market
demand or a firm’s cash flows (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Ironically, many analysts now contend that the
creation of massive over-capacity in high value-added activities such petrochemicals and automobile
manufacturing is presently the major obstacle to continued growth in the region (International Monetary
Fund, 1998). Collectively, these considerations suggest GLE asset bases are characterised by over-
investment in fixed assets relative to the firm’s scale and the size of its potential market.
Internationalisation.  In the Nationalist Era, FBGs concentrated on export oriented production in labour-
intensive sectors, while GLEs focused upon domestic capacity building in capital-intensive sectors. As
such, GLEs had few international activities beyond resource-seeking investments. While many
governments in Southeast Asia have perceived national competitive advantages in promoting indigenous
enterprises of multinational scale, very few have seen the GLE as the appropriate vehicle for spearheading
internationalisation.
Singapore is the exception, dissatisfied with the international achievements of its domestic
entrepreneurs, its government has chosen to utilise the public sector in its internationalisation drive.
Following sequential state strategies termed  'the next lap' and 'the learning nation’, Schein (1996:57)
describes Singapore’s Economic Development Board’s (EDB) new thrust as 'going overseas'. The stated
intention of Singapore’s EDB is to create proprietary asset based MNEs whose high value added
24
functions are performed within Singapore’s borders. As Singapore has few companies with marketable
proprietary assets, the plan is to purchase them abroad and absorb them domestically8. This approach is a
variant of the Korean model of competence building (Hobday, 1995). This discussion suggests that GLEs
are most typically domestically focused. International activities are limited to resource seeking
investments (e.g. oil and gas). However, In countries with more active industrial policies, the international
activities of GLEs are strategic asset (technology) seeking (Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998).
New Managers
The emergence of the New Managers can be traced to three sets of institutional forces which have
marked the Modern Era (1978-Present) in Southeast Asia; managerial availability, a new pro-business
ideology and new technology. The management style of the New Managers tends to emulate Japanese
and/or Western business practices.
Origins of the New Managers
In the past two decades, there has emerged several new sources of professional managers in
Southeast Asia who, exposed to a variety of different influences, do not necessarily embody old values
(Vogel, 1991). Many in this new generation of managers received graduate engineering and/or business
education in Western universities. Many students did not return home immediately upon graduation, but
remained in the West to work for several years. However, many subsequently returned and promoted
professional management practices and the absorption of new technology in their firms. An important
second source of professional management in the Modern Era has been a large number of young
managers who gained experience working in the local subsidiaries of MNEs. Extensive Japanese
investment has been accompanied by the transfer of management techniques, especially at the plant level
(Thong, 1991). Additionally, the expansion in the numbers of local universities also contributed
positively to the supply of trained managerial talent (Vogel, 1991). Collectively these sources contribute a
pool of potential managers that did not exist until quite recently.
Often dominated by military personnel, state bureaucracies of the Nationalist Era were often
disinterested in the fortunes of business. In the Nationalist Era, new governments were often preoccupied
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with national security issues. McVey (1992) now sees an aligning of interests between the state
bureaucracy and big business. Political rents secured by bureaucrats from office holding and cronyism are
relatively fleeting and insecure. To assure a more secure revenue stream, officials needed two things; the
acquisition of sufficient business knowledge to enable the official to oversee the handling of his money,
and effective legal guarantees for private property to ensure it could not be confiscated once out of office
(McVey, 1992). At the same time vulnerable entrepreneurs actively sought to cultivate relations with
powerful bureaucrats to protect their interests (Laothamatas, 1994). Under these circumstances of
common interest and balanced power-relations, officials and entrepreneurs began to develop a measure of
trust and mutual accommodation. One effect of this new accommodation is the institutionalisation of
relational contracting (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). As McVey felicitously puts it, bureaucrats were
transformed from ‘parasites to promoters’ of business (1992:26).
The third force marking the emergence of the New Managers is the arrival of new technologies in
the region. Import substitution and labour cost driven export development policies traditionally produced
a product market emphasis on textiles and low cost electronics. In the Modern Era, the new growth
markets are in telecommunications, PCs, and media. The size, internationalism and intellectual property
requirements of these new industries are ill suited to the self-financing ways of the traditional FBG. Often
the assets needed to compete in these new industries are proprietary, firm specific intangibles that are
embodied in firms’ processes and routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Corporate-financial arrangements
that support the creation, utilisation, maintenance and transfer of intangible proprietary assets are more
specialised and complex than those for tangible assets (Prowse, 1996). Large capital intensive ventures in
the region have normally been the domain of GLEs. Unfortunately, the GLEs with their dual mission and
bureaucratic structures have largely been unable to effectively exploit the available opportunities in high-
tech industries. The firms we call the New Managers have emerged to take advantage of these new market
opportunities.
Strategy Formation. New Managers are typically founded as entrepreneurial and family owned firms,
but their ownership is often quickly diluted because of the need to raise new financial capital. Unable to
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fund growth from internal earnings, firms active in these areas have often been compelled to raise money
on the region’s capital markets. However, capital markets are not well developed in the region so New
Managers face difficulties in accessing growth capital (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2000) and have sought
and received financial assistance from capital rich FBGs.
New Managers face a number of key strategic issues. First, an important issue for New Managers
relates to their ability to maintain independence from potentially predatory or rent-seeking investors.
Second, the ability to use subcontracting networks to cope with variation in demand is lessened in
industries with proprietary processes and more complex operations. Third, the technological complexity
of these industries is such that founding entrepreneurs have been forced to rely on outsiders, professional
managers and high-tech professionals. The confluence of these factors has made the ownership and
management of New Managers both more heterogeneous and transparent then other forms of enterprise
active in Southeast Asia. The strategic opportunities in the new technologies are such that New Managers
have organisation-building strategic goals related to growth in assets, revenues, and technological
leadership.
Product Market Scope . Positioned in high growth market segments, most New Managers have not yet
generated sufficient free-cash flow to contemplate diversification out of their core industries. Indeed, in
telecommunications and in information technology, rapid local market expansion has provided ample
opportunity for focused growth. In the prior Nationalist Era, Mainland China was a closed market for
most Southeast Asian firms. Today, New Managers face abundant opportunities in China. However, the
lack of a distribution and service infrastructure in China requires considerable investment, another factor
encouraging focused growth. New Managers typically emphasise the development of core competencies
and proprietary assets, which provide a competitive advantage in the market place. Where resources
permit, these competencies provide a rationale for diversification into closely related fields. However,
New Managers pursue tightly focused product-market strategies, a product market strategy that stands in
stark contrast to the conglomerate strategies of FBGs and CBGs.
Asset Regimes. Specialised and proprietary assets are essential to the competitiveness of the New
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Managers. However, funding the development and acquisition of strategic assets requires New Managers
to forgo dividends and retain profits for investment in their core businesses. The adoption of growth goals
by New Managers suggests a heavy capital investment schedule. As such, New Managers may exhibit
negative cash flow patterns over periods of high growth. Additionally, a greater proportion of total assets
is likely to be funded by outsiders. In many ways, the asset regimes and financial resource utilisation
patterns of New Managers correspond to that of a high growth firm in Western economies. These
considerations suggest that New Managers create high market value added (MVA) (the difference
between market and book value), and command high price/earnings ratios reflecting their development of
proprietary assets.
Internationalisation.  In some ways, New Managers resemble the classical asset protecting MNE, which
expands overseas to exploit firm-specific capabilities (Dunning, 1995). However, they differ in one
important way. New Managers are latecomer MNEs (Hobday, 1995) and must overcome significant
obstacles in acquiring and developing proprietary capabilities. In the Modern Era, Southeast Asian states
have attempted to assist firms by building competence-enhancing institutions such as new universities,
science parks, and innovation centres. However, New Managers have attempted to accelerate the process
by purchasing strategic assets in global markets. Therefore, the initial international activities of New
Managers are essentially strategic asset-seeking via merger, acquisition, joint ventures and a host of
alliances (Hobday, 1995). The high cost of this approach contributes to the need for external capital. To
the extent that New Managers eschew the profitable short-term opportunities offered by regional
diversification into unrelated activities, they can focus on developing proprietary skills and resources. A
number of Southeast Asian enterprises have reached this position and are internationalising to reap the
advantages offered by proprietary assets. The pattern of internationalisation of New Managers is rarely
strictly sequential and linear. Rather we may see both asset-seeking investments and, where firms have
developed them, asset-protecting investments occurring simultaneously.
Managers and Merchants: The Dynamics of Southeast Asian Firm Adaptation
Since the arrival of CBGs at the beginning of the 18th century, firms characterised by a strong merchant
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logic have dominated large parts of the economies of Southeast Asia. Indeed, just as the CBGs played a
predominant role in Southeast Asia during the Colonial Era, Family Business Groups have predominated
in both the Nationalist and Modern Eras. In this context, firms characterised by a managerial logic have
played supporting, rather than leading roles in the economies of Southeast Asia. In this regard, the
emergence of the GLE in the Nationalist Era can be traced to the need to build and provide the
infrastructure necessary for economic development rather than as a primary means of industrial
organisation. The analysis presented here indicates that the Southeast Asian legacy of merchant corporate
forms has a number of important implications with regard to the global competitiveness of the region’s
firms and economies in the Modern Era.
Merchant forms of organisations have certain inherent advantages and disadvantages relative to
their managerial counterparts (Carney & Gedajlovic, In-Press). The prevailing logic of managerial
enterprise is based upon organisational growth through hierarchical co-ordination (Chandler, 1990). This
managerial logic manifests itself in policies of sustained capital expenditures in efficiently scaled
production facilities, in distribution and marketing assets, and the managerial and functional expertise
needed to effectively co-ordinate the two. Hierarchical organisation is particularly effective when
specialised investments have clear productivity advantages over generic assets (Williamson, 1991).
Similarly, many high-productivity dedicated investments such as those required in resource extraction,
primary processing, and in knowledge intensive industries require patient equity capital. Safeguarding
such assets demands an attendant rational-legal governance structure (Williamson, 1991). On the other
hand, the relational contracting propensity of merchant forms provide inadequate governance capacity for
many specialised assets.
If the core component of a managerial logic is hierarchical co-ordination, its equivalent
component in the merchant logic is reputation. A conferred status, reputation is trust in a firm's capacity
to deliver on hard-to-enforce and unenforceable agreements. Reputation is embodied in many intangible
assets such as brand equity and technology know-how, but it is also a firm-specific quality that need not
attach to a particular product or process (Hall, 1992). As defined here, reputation is a generalizable
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imputation of trust that may be applied to a variety of non-standard and non-routine transactions.
Firm reputation may fill institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu, 1997) such as in economic
sectors where production is ill-suited to hierarchical organisation, or the use of specialised assets, and in
countries with weak, or non-existent protection for property rights and proprietary assets. Chapman
(1985) notes that this is the role played by CBGs in the Colonial Era. Specifically, Chapman notes poor
manufacturing performance by CBGs, but points to a genius for mercantile organisation based upon their
reputation as reliable, customers, suppliers and business partners. Such business structures are particularly
well suited to operating in highly uncertain environments. FBGs played a comparable role in Southeast
Asia in the turbulent post WWII Nationalist Era and in the Modern Era in overseas investments located in
countries with weak protection for property rights.
In general, firms in the Southeast Asian region have failed to grow to a large size which limits
their ability to realise scale and scope economies (Chandler, 1990). While some firms are developing a
regional prominence, very few have achieved global scope. Indeed, relative to their northern neighbours
in Korea and Japan, firms from the Southeast Asian region are quite regional in scope and small in size.
Given the region’s growth, the absence of firms with a global capability is something of an enigma. The
merchant and trading logic of Southeast Asia’s first large firms, the CBGs mitigated against growth. In
the Modern Era, their descendants, FBGs have only rarely established permanent professionally managed
organisations. Their entrepreneurial dynamism and use of personal networks have facilitated rapid
responses to emerging opportunities. However, such personal networks do not appear to provide the
organisational depth required for global operations or for competing in technologically advanced
industries.
Forces in the Modern Era are engendering a new type of firm (New Managers), which is better
suited to employ the region’s available managerial talent and to exploit new technologies. Such firms
have often been encouraged by policy makers who recognise their importance for industrial growth and
the creation of a diversified economic base for their countries. However, the growth of new high
technology firms in Southeast Asia has been impeded because these firms are often easy take-over targets
for predatory conglomerates. Relatively undeveloped and highly volatile equity markets and the absence
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of local bond markets often require capital hungry firms to seek major equity from a single dominant
investor. The loss of autonomy in the early stages of their development has often retarded the growth
potential of New Managers (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2000).
The transformation of the predominantly merchant trading logic to one that supports the
development of a broader range of industrial organisation is likely to require major institutional-level
change. One conclusion stemming from the analysis presented here is that the development of more
broadly based economies, and in particular the development of high technology sectors of efficient scale
and scope will require greater diversity both in terms of corporate ownership and managerial responses
than are currently present in Southeast Asia. In this regard, the strengths of the family ownership and
management of enterprises in certain economic sectors constitutes an impediment to the development of
economic sectors where de-personalised patient capital and professional management are required.
In this regard, the Asian financial crisis may have created the impetus for fundamental structural
change to the economies of Southeast Asia. For example, highly leveraged firms with significant foreign
currency exposure are vulnerable to bankruptcy. As these firms attempt to re-schedule their debts through
financial restructuring such as debt-equity swaps, there is an opportunity for investors to demand
fundamental changes in a firm’s structure and operational practices. Institutional environments are not
immutable and are subject to forces emanating from other regions and cultures. More specifically, the
integration of world markets as well as regulatory and social changes occurring in the global economy are
producing institutional-level forces supportive of an organisational model approximating the New
Managers. However, the longevity of the CBGs who adapted to institutional change by transferring their
agency skills to new product lines are a testament to the fact that 'fossilised' corporate forms may persist
in sectors long after the conditions that brought them into being have passed. In this regard, the single
largest obstacle to the creation of efficiently scaled and adequately funded globally competitive, high
technology firms (and sectors) in Southeast Asia may be the region’s legacy of successful merchant
organisations which emerged and developed to meet the institutional and competitive demands of a
previous era.
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Notes
                                                                
1 For the purposes of this paper we confine our analysis to the capitalist economies that founded the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand. We exclude Japan and Korea and Greater China (i.e. Hong Kong and Taiwan).
2 Colonial Government in Indonesia ended abruptly in 1949. Self-government in Malaya was introduced
more gradually and later. The Philippines was a Spanish colony until 1890 when it was a US Colony until
1949. Except briefly during the brief Japanese occupation of WWII, Thailand did not experience full
colonial administration. Nevertheless, economic activity in Thailand was largely in the hands of
organizations we call CBGs.  Following World War II, Thailand was characterized by a more
nationalistic government than had been apparent in the Colonial Era.
3 For example, Inchcape began life as the Calcutta and Burmah Steam Navigation Company that
developed logging, oil and shipping interests. It later transformed itself into an automobile franchise
distributing 8% of Toyota's global output (Jones, 1988).
4 For example, since Malaysian interests acquired control and replaced its British management in 1982,
Sime-Darby has adopted a strategy international expansion. Indeed, Sime-Darby is often cited as the
region's most well known MNE (Ragayah, 1999). Yet in 1994, over 70% of its 120 foreign subsidiaries
and associate companies were located in one of three countries; Britain, Hong Kong and Singapore
(Sime-Darby Annual Report, 1994). Of Sime-Darby's 1997 revenues, 88% were earned in Malaysia,
Singapore and Hong Kong (Sime-Darby Annual Report, 1997).
5 The Shanghai cotton industrialists that relocated en masse to Hong Kong in 1949 are an exception in this
regard. (Wong, 1988).
6 Risk diversification is not limited to Chinese FBG’s, it has been observed of Italian, French, (Fukuyama,
1995) and British family business groups (Chandler, 1990).
7 In Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand many enterprises are privately held, but operate under the state's
aegis (Suehiro, 1992, Robison, 1992).
8 For example, Singapore Technology Holdings acquired stakes worth US$500m in several Silicon Valley
semiconductor firms with the explicit goal of technology transfer.
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